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Recent Decisions
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY-

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF

A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT-The United States Supreme Court announced that a criminal defendant who is placed under hypnosis
possesses a constitutional right to present hypnotically refreshed
testimony at trial.

Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
In Rock v. Arkansas' the United States Supreme Court considered whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify on her own behalf when the defendant's memory was refreshed
by hypnosis prior to her testimony. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, stated that a criminal defendant's right to testify on her
own behalf is inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment, and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
constitution provides the defendant with a right to be heard, produce favorable testimony, and decide whether or not to testify on
her own behalf, and that these rights extended to hypnotically induced testimony.3 However, Justice Blackmun cautioned that testimony refreshed by hypnosis may only be admitted if procedural
safeguards are adhered to which lessen the inaccuracies associated
with hypnosis.4 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the post-hypnotic testimony, providing procedural prerequisites are followed, could be admitted as evidence at trial in
accordance with a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
testify. 5
Petitioner Vickie Lorene Rock was charged in the Arkansas state
court with manslaughter after fatally shooting her husband." Be1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
Id. at 2709-10.
Id.
Id. at 2714.
Id. at 2710-14.
Id. at 2706.
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cause Rock could not recall the details of the shooting incident, she
attempted to refresh her memory by submitting to hypnosis under
the care of a neuropsychologist, Dr. Betty Back.7 Before Dr. Back
began the hypnosis, she recorded Rock's original recollections of
the shooting.8 During the two hypnosis sessions, which were tape
recorded, Rock failed to remember any new facts." However, subsequent to the sessions she was able to recall additional details of the
shooting.' 0 The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion seeking to exclude all of Rock's testimony induced by the hypnosis sessions."
After a pretrial hearing, the judge ordered that Rock's testimony
be limited to her original recollections as recorded by Dr. Back and
excluded all testimony which was hypnotically induced. 2 The jury
found Rock guilty of manslaughter. s
Rock appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 4 alleging first
that the trial court's exclusion of the post-hypnotic testimony violated her fundamental right to testify in her own defense. 15 Sec7. Id.
8. Id. at 2706-07, n.2. The neuropsychologist's notes read as follows:
Pt states she & husb. were discussing moving out to a trailer she had prev. owned.
He was 'set on' moving out to the trailer-she felt they should discuss. She bec[amel
upset & went to another room to lay down. Bro. came & left. She came out to eat
some of the pizza, he wouldn't allow her to have any. She said she would go out and
get [something] to eat he wouldn't allow her-He pushed her against a wall an end
table in the corner [with] a gun on it. They were the night watchmen for business
that sets behind them. She picked gun up stated she didn't want him hitting her
anymore. He wouldn't let her out door, slammed door & 'gun went off & he fell & he
died' [pt looked misty eyed here-near tears]. App. 40.
Id.
9. Id. at 2706-07.
10. Id. at 2707. Based upon the appeal and trial transcript the opinion states that
Rock recollected "that at the time of the incident she had her thumb on the hammer of the
gun, but had not held her finger on the trigger. She also recalled that the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during the scuffle." Id.
It was as from these details remembered in the hypnosis sessions that caused the prosecutor to examine the gun used in the commission of the crime. "That inspection revealed that
the gun was defective and prone to fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger's being
pulled." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The trial court ruled that "testimony of matters recalled by Defendant due to
hypnosis will be excluded because of inherent unreliability and the effect of hypnosis in
eliminating any meaningful cross-examination on those matters." Id. The defense presented
an expert witness who testified the gun was defective, but this evidence could not be reenforced because the trial court excluded Rock's hypnotically induced recollection that the
gun misfired. Id., n.3.
13. Id. "[Rock] was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine." Id.
14. Rock v. Arkansas, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (1986).
15. Id. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 84. The Supreme Court has determined that the fourteenth, sixth, and fifth amendments grant a defendant the right to testify in his own behalf.

1988

Recent Decision

ond, Rock argued that even if hypnotically induced testimony may
be inadmissible, her statements would have been admitted but for
the trial court's overly restrictive application of the State v. Hurd1"
guidelines. 17 Finally, Rock claimed that the Arkansas per se rule of
prohibiting all post-hypnotic testimony was misapplied to her
18
case.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, responding to Rock's first claim,
determined that a defendant's fundamental right to testify could
be restricted by the standard rules of evidence.19 The court reasoned that a trial court could reasonably label the hypnotically induced testimony unreliable as evidence and exclude it without violating the constitution.20 In response to Rock's second argument on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas declined to adopt Hurd
and affirmed the trial court's decision.2 ' The Arkansas high court
criticized the Hurd guidelines for failing to alleviate the dangers
associated with admitting hypnotically induced testimony.22 The
court also noted that utilizing the Hurd approach would unduly
burden the pretrial process while offering no additional benefits.2 3
After weighing the probative value against the inherent risks, the
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that hypnotically induced testimony should be excluded from trial, although pre-hypnotic testimony might be utilized.24 Concerning Rock's third claim that the
per se rule was misapplied in her case, the court reiterated its decision to only permit testimony consistent with the neuropsychologist's pre-hypnosis records or a defendant's statements." As this
107 S. Ct. at 2709-10.
16. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Hurd held that the trial court must first determine whether hypnosis is an appropriate
method for the type of memory loss encountered. If the trial court determines that in this
instance hypnosis could reveal normal recall, then the trial court must determine whether
certain procedural safeguards were complied with in order to minimize inherent suggestibility in the hypnotic process. The Hurd Court, however, held the hypnotically induced testimony to be inadmissible because the procedural safeguards were not properly observed. For
a discussion of the Hurd guidelines, see infra note 231.
17. 288 Ark. at 576, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 570-80, 708 S.W.2d at 84-85.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 573-74, 708 S.W.2d at 82.
22. Id. at 574, n.2, 708 S.W.2d at 82, n.2. For example, some of the dangers associated
with hypnosis left uncorrected by the Hurd guidelines are confabulation and "unwarranted
confidence in the validity of his [the witness'] recollection." Id. at 82-83.
23. Id. at 575, 708 S.W.2d at 82-83.
24. Id. at 576-78, 708 S.W.2d at 83-84.
25. Id. at 576-77, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
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rule was followed in Rock's case, the court held that she failed to
establish evidence of a violation. s6
Rock appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
which granted certiorari on the issue of whether the Arkansas evidentiary rule excluding hypnotically induced testimony of a criminal defendant is unconstitutional. 7
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,28 initially noted that
Congress established a general competency statute2 9 which stipulates that a criminal defendant is competent to testify in his own
defense if he so requests. 30 The Court reiterated that the right to
testify advances both the "detection of guilt" and "the protection
of innocence."31 The Court also stated that the privilege to testify
presents a fundamental right inherent in the fourteenth, the sixth,
and the fifth amendments of the constitution. 2
As a first part of its analysis, the Court examined the fourteenth
amendment 3 and found that a basic element of due process is an
opportunity to be heard and to offer testimony.3 4 The Court also
noted that the sixth amendment compulsory process clause" necessitates that a criminal defendant be able to call a favorable witness.3" In addition, an accused, often the most significant witness
to the advancement of his case, has a right to testify on his own
behalf.37 Thus, the sixth amendment ensures that a criminal de26. Id.
27. 107 S. Ct. 2708 (1987).
28. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Powell, and Stevens.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3481. Section 3481 states in pertinent part:
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United
States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State,
District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a
competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him.
Id.
30. 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
31. Id., citing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 581 (1961).
32. 107 S. Ct. at 2709-10. More specifically, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment and the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;.
34. 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
Id.
right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
37. 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
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fendant may present at trial his own version of the dispute. 8 As a
final step in its analysis, the Court examined the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination8 9 and concluded that only if a
person first has the right to testify on his own behalf can he then
40
decide whether or not testifying would be in his best interest.
Thus, inherent within the fifth amendment is the right of a defendant to choose to testify.4
After discussing the applicable constitutional provisions, Justice
Blackmun reviewed two prior cases where the Court examined the
constitutionality of a state rule which attempted to ensure trustworthy evidence by restricting a criminal defendant's right to testify or to call witnesses. 4 2 In the first case, Washington v. Texas, 43
the Court held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting principals,
accomplices, or accessories from testifying on behalf of one another
because of the possibility that the codefendants' relationship
would likely cause each to "try to swear the other out of the
charge. ' ' 44 The Court reasoned in Washington that a trial court
should permit testimony of all witnesses with knowledge of relevant facts and allow the fact-finder to determine the credibility of
the witnesses.4 5 The Washington Court concluded that their interpretation was consistent with the sixth amendment compulsory
process right of a criminal defendant to obtain witnesses in his
favor.46 Thus, the Court found that a state may not arbitrarily
deny a criminal defendant the right to have witnesses present relevant and material testimony at trial.'
The Supreme Court's prohibition against a state rule excluding
all testimony of a witness favoring the defendant from testifying at
all was extended in Chambers v. Mississippi5 to forbid a state
from arbitrarily limiting portions of a witness' testimony on the
stand.' 9 In Chambers, the Court held that where a state rule of
38. Id. at 2710.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.
Id.
40. 107 S. Ct. at 2710.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
44. Id. at 21 (quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 355 (1892)).
45. 388 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
46. 388 U.S. at 22.
47. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
48. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
49. Id. There, a criminal defendant was not permitted to cross-examine a witness in
state court who had previously confessed to acquaintances about committing the murder to
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evidence conflicts with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to present witnesses, and "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice." 50 However, the Court cautioned, the right to call witnesses
possessing relevant testimony is not absolute. 5 1 Deference must be
shown to procedural and evidentiary aspects of a criminal trial.2
Thus, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine
whether the interests of a state's evidentiary rules justify the restrictions placed on a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
3
5

testify.

In evaluating Arkansas' per se rule of limiting an accused's testimony to matters remembered before hypnosis, Justice Blackmun
criticized the effect of excluding the testimony of a hypnotized defendant "without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances
under which it took place, or any independent verification of the
information it produced." In Rock's case, the Arkansas per se
rule exercised a significantly negative effect on her testimony at
trial because it prevented her from discussing many of the critical
events on the day of the shooting. 5 Justice Blackmun reasoned
that had Rock's testimony not been restrained, it could have been
confirmed by the ballistic expert's testimony.56
Justice Blackmun argued that the Arkansas Supreme Court
could not justify its per se inadmissibility rule against defendants
by adopting the rationale of other states that only exclude the hypnotically induced testimony of witnesses. 7 The Court also noted
which the criminal defendant was charged. Mississippi's prohibition on a criminal defendant's cross-examination of a favorable witness originated from its hearsay and "voucher"
rules. Id. at 295-97. The Supreme Court held that the state's "voucher" rule was contrary to
the fourteenth amendment due process clause which guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to confront and cross-examine those witnesses he calls in his own behalf. Id. at 294.
50. Id. at 302.
51. Id. at 295.
52. Id. The Court recognized that rules of procedure and evidence are necessary to
ensure fairness and reliability in trials as well as to prohibit the testimony of infants and
persons with mental infirmities who lack the ability to properly observe and recall events.
107 S. Ct. at 2711, n.11.
53. Id. at 2711.
54. Id. at 2711-12.
55. Id. at 2712. Rock's testimony was limited to the pre-hypnosis notes taken by Dr.
Back. Id.
56. Id. After hypnosis, Rock remembered she did not have her finger on the gun trigger when her husband hit her arm and the pistol discharged. The ballistic's expert determined the murder weapon was defective and could fire without using the trigger. Id. at 2707.
57. Id. at 2712.
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that many other states permit hypnotically refreshed testimony in
one form or another.5" The Court admitted that an individual's response often includes "an increase in both correct and incorrect
recollections." 5 9 However, Justice Blackmun recognized that the
inaccuracies could be lessened by instituting procedural guidelines.6 0 Furthermore, corroborating evidence, cross-examination,
and a jury made aware of the risks associated with hypnosis will
help minimize the flaws associated with hypnotically refreshed
testimony. 6'
In concluding his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun recognized
that uncertainties associated with using hypnosis to refresh a defendant's memory exist; however, he determined that these concerns failed to justify the Arkansas per se rule excluding all the
defendant's post-hypnotic testimony. 2 Instead, Justice Blackmun
recommended that the state establish guidelines to monitor the validity of post-hypnotic recollections and utilize these criteria to argue for the exclusion of all testimony as inherently unreliable in a
particular case.63 In applying this analysis to Rock's case, the
Court stated that the gun's defective condition corroborated
Rock's post-hypnotic testimony.6 Furthermore, the recordings of
the hypnosis sessions failed to suggest that leading questions were
involved.65 These facts supported an argument in favor of admitting Rock's testimony.6 6 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded
58. Id. at 2713, n.16.
59. Id. at 2713. In terms of inaccurate memories, the Court outlined three common
problem areas:
[T]he subject becomes 'suggestible' and may try to please the hypnotist with answers the subject thinks will be met with approval; the subject is likely to 'confabulate,' that is, to fill in details from the imagination in order to make an answer more
coherent and complete; and, the subject experiences 'memory hardening,' which gives
him great confidence in both true and false memories, making effective cross-examination more difficult.
Id.
60. Id. at 2714. The Court recommended safeguards which included having the hypnosis performed only by a specially trained psychologist or psychiatrist independent of the
controversy, in a neutral location with only the witness and hypnotist present, with all sessions tape or video recorded.
61. Id.
62. Id. "But [Arkansas] has not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always
so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it
should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on
trial." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2714-15.
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that the Arkansas per se rule excluding Rock's testimony was an
impermissible infringement on her fundamental right to testify.",
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 8 interpreted both
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion and the Arkansas Supreme
Court's opinion as admitting that: 1) several side effects of hypnosis tend to undermine the credibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony,6 and 2) no procedural safeguards exist to correct the testimony's inherently unreliable nature.7 0 In light of these conclusions,
Chief Justice Rehnquist could find no constitutional justification
for the majority's decision to invalidate the Arkansas per se exclusion rule and require the trial court to assess the scientific validity
71
of hypnotically induced testimony on a case-by-case basis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist perceived the majority's holding as centering on the defendant's constitutional right to testify on her own
behalf, and he criticized the Court for failing to realize that all evidence should be subject to reasonable restrictions.7 2 In Rock's case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, unrestricted hypnotically induced
testimony would frustrate the truth-seeking function at trial7 3
since the side effects of hypnosis 7 would make cross-examination,
75
which is to ensure truthful statements, more difficult.
The Chief Justice also complained that the Court's decision re67. Id.
68. Id. at 2715. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, and Scalia.
69. Id. "[A] hypnotized individual becomes subject to suggestion, is likely to confabulate, and experiences artificially increased confidence in both true and false memories following hypnosis." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2715-16. Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the cases interpreting the
due process clause do not provide a criminal defendant with an absolute right to put forth
evidence. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-75 (1948); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481-482 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). The Chief Justice argued
the Court's compulsory process clause cases endorse restrictions on a criminal defendant's
presentation of evidence where legitimate countervailing interests exist. See, e.g., Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the constitution does not excuse a criminal defendant from honoring "the rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness
and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." 107 S. Ct. at 2716, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302.
73. 107 S. Ct. at 2715. The truth-seeking function of permitting defendants to testify
on their own behalf improves both the 'detection of guilt' as well as the 'protection of innocence.' Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 581 (1961).
74. See supra note 59.
75. 107 S. Ct. at 2715. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that even Justice Blackmun recognized that hypnosis could make cross-examination more difficult. Id.
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stricts both state and federal courts in their ability to respond with
flexibility to growth in the scientific understanding of hypnosis."
He argued that the Supreme Court traditionally has left the state
courts free to establish their own criminal procedures" and finely
tune their rules of evidence.78 In the present case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found that while the majority's standard for determining the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony had
merit,79 the Arkansas Supreme Court's response appeared equally
sensible."0 However, until the use of hypnosis grows out of its scientific infancy and achieves greater reliability, the Chief Justice
would continue to dissent against any attempts to impose the
Court's views of the hypnosis issue on the state courts.81
The right of a criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf
had its origins at common law. 82 During that time, the parties were
disqualified from testifying at trial." By the end of the sixteenth
century, the parties in civil actions were still prohibited from testifying, but defendants in criminal actions were required to present
their own defense.' After 1695, an accused charged with treason
could call witnesses who would present evidence in his behalf.85
Subsequent to 1701, a criminal defendant facing a felony charge
could also present witnesses; however, the criminal defendant was
still prohibited from directly presenting evidence himself.8
In the United States, state legislatures first provided a criminal
defendant with a right to testify on his own behalf when Maine
adopted a general competency statute in 1864. 8 7 Congress ap76. 107 S. Ct. at 2716.
77. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973).
78. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
79. 107 S. Ct. at 2716. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern with the administrative difficulties of the trial court applying the majority's analysis on a case-by-case basis. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2708.
83. 2 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 576 (J. Chadborn Rev. 1979) p. 810. The common law
rationale for excluding the parties was a fear that their pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the trial would most likely encourage false testimony. Id.
84. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573 (1961). Criminal defendants were not permitted assistance of counsel nor were they permitted to call witnesses in their own behalf.
Id. at 573-74. Consequently, the criminal trial was characterized as "a long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the Crown, in which they questioned each other and
grappled with each other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reason-

ing." 1 Stephen,

HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND,

p. 326.

85. 365 U.S. at 574.
86. Id.
87. See Wigmore supra note 83 at § 579, n.2. Other northeastern states gave a crimi-
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proved a similar statute when it passed the Act of March 16,
1878.88 England enacted a comparable law in 1898.89 Most southern
states later adopted a competency statute, although several added
a proviso requiring the accused to appear as the first witness to
testify for the defense.90 However, Georgia still refused to allow a
criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf,9 ' thus limiting the
defendant's participation in state court to presenting an unsworn
92
statement.
The case law providing a criminal defendant with the right to
testify has been recognized by the Supreme Court as arising from
several clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court has
interpreted the fourteenth amendment due process clause," sixth
amendment compulsory process clause, 4 and fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination 5 as supporting a criminal denal defendant the right to testify including Massachusetts in 1866, Connecticut in 1867,
New York and New Hampshire in 1869, and New Jersey in 1871.
88. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §3481.
89. See Wigmore supra note 83 at § 579.
90.

Id.

91. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577. The judicial system reasoned that permitting the accused to testify, placed the criminal defendant in a disadvantaged position. See Wigmore
supra note 83 at § 579.
If being competent, he failed to testify, that would damage his cause more seriously
than if he were able to claim that his silence were enforced by law. Moreover, if he
did testify, that would injure more than assist his cause, since by undergoing the
ordeal of cross examination, he would appear at a disadvantage dangerous even to an
innocent man.
Id. at n.8.
92. Id. at n.7.
Until as recently as 1962, a criminal defendant in Georgia was not permitted to
testify under oath. He was allowed to make an unsworn statement. If he did so, he
could not be compelled to answer questions on cross-examinations. On the other
hand, he had no right to have his statements elicited by questions from counsel.
Id.

93. The fourteenth amendment states that: "No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. For

specific due process cases, see, e.g. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
94. The sixth amendment compulsory process clause reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. For specific compulsory process cases, see, e.g., Washington v. Texas 388 U.S. 14 (1967),
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Adams v. U.S. ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942).

95.

The fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall

...

be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For specific fifth

amendment cases, see, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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fendant's right to personally present at trial his version of the facts
in dispute. However, the Court has not labeled the right of a defendant to testify as absolute and has placed certain restrictions on
a defendant's ability to appear as a witness at trial."
The Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Georgia9 addressed the issue
of whether the fourteenth amendment due process clause provides
a criminal defendant in a state court with the right to be questioned by his counsel on the witness stand." In Ferguson, at the
trial of a criminal defendant charged and convicted of murder, the
judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning his client. 9 The
Supreme Court took exception to the Georgia rule, reasoning that
a criminal defendant under the threat of losing life or liberty could
not properly advance his own defense without the aid of counsel.1 00
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge's denial of
the defense counsel's request to elicit questions from the criminal
defendant at trial violated the fourteenth amendment due process
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) and Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925). For specific limitation cases in the due process area, see In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948), Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). For specific cases restricting testimony in the compulsory process area, see
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410, U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
97. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Justice Brennan delivered the court's
opinion. Justice Frankfurter filed a separate opinion, joined by Justice Clark, for reversing
Ferguson's conviction. Id. at 598. Justice Clark filed a concurring opinion which was joined
by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 601.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 571. The trial court's decision to exclude questioning was based upon a law
originally passed in 1868 which provided that:
In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and jury
such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall be under
oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it. They may
believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner shall not be
compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination, should he think proper to
decline to answer.
GA. CODE § 38-415 (1933). The trial judge also relied on an incompetency rule with origins in
the nineteenth century that applied to persons "charged in any criminal proceeding with the
commission of any indictable offense or any offense punishable on summary conviction." GA.
CODE § 38-415 (1933).
100. 365 U.S. at 595. The Court stated:
But to hold that the moment the defendant is placed upon the stand he shall be
debarred of all assistance from his counsel. . . would in our opinion be to make...
[a]n innocent man, charged with a heinous offence, and against whom evidence of
guilt has been given . . . much more likely to be overwhelmed by his situation, and
embarrassed, when called upon for explanation, than the offender, who is hardened in
guilt; and if he is unlearned, unaccustomed to speak in public assemblies, or to put
together his thoughts in consecutive order anywhere, it will not be surprising if his
explanation is incoherent, or if it overlooks important circumstances.
Id. at 595, citing Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511, 519-20 (1865).
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clause. 10 1
The Supreme Court also addressed a criminal defendant's rights
102
under the fourteenth amendment in Chambers v. Mississippi.
There, McDonald admitted murdering a police officer but later repudiated his confession.103 Chambers was charged with the murder
and at trial the judge denied not only Chambers' motion to call
McDonald as an adverse witness, but also the defendant's request
to present witnesses that would have undermined McDonald's repudiation.1 0 4 The issue before the Court was whether Chambers'
due process rights were violated by the state court's denial of his
request to cross-examine an adverse witness and present witnesses
in his own favor.105
The Supreme Court in Chambers found no need to establish new
standards of constitutional law,16 but instead reaffirmed that a
criminal defendant possesses a right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, especially in light of their significant contribution to the
truth-seeking process at trial. 10 7 The Court also reiterated that a
criminal defendant possesses a fundamental right to present witnesses on his own behalf.108 If the testimony of the witnesses contains assurances of trustworthiness, the hearsay rule should not
prohibit admission of the evidence.109 Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that the state court's denial of Chambers' request to
cross-examine McDonald, coupled with the refusal to admit the
favorable witnesses' testimony, violated Chambers' fourteenth
amendment due process rights.110
The Supreme Court also found a constitutional right of a criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf in its analysis of In re
Oliver."' In that case, the defendant was charged with criminal
101. 365 U.S. at 596.
102. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Powell. Id at 285. Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 303. Justice
Rehnquist submitted a dissenting opinion. Id. at 308.
103. Id. at 294.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 285.
106. Id. at 302.
107. Id. at 295, citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See also Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court did note that in some instances the right to confrontation must yield to other legitimate interests. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs 408 U.S. 204
(1972).
108. See, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967), and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
109. 410 U.S. 302.
110. Id. at 302.
111. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). Justice Black delivered the majority opinion. Id.

1988

Recent Decision

contempt and convicted in a secret trial where he was not permitted to obtain counsel, prepare a defense, cross-examine opposing
witnesses, or summon witnesses in his defense.1 1 2 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the nature of the proceeding denied the criminal defendant a reasonable "opportunity to be heard in his defense."" ' In addition, the Court noted that, at a minimum, the
fourteenth amendment provides a criminal defendant with the
right to receive notice of the charges filed against him, obtain his
day in court, cross-examine the witnesses against him, have an attorney present, and "offer his own testimony."" 4 Thus, having
found that these procedural protections of the due process clause,
including the right to testify, were violated"" the Supreme Court
reversed the criminal defendant's conviction."'
The Supreme Court's application of the compulsory process
clause to the rights of a criminal defendant to present favorable
witnesses at trial was discussed in Washington v. Texas."7 At his
murder trial, Washington claimed as a defense that his co-participant had shot the victim."' The co-participant was prepared to
testify on Washington's behalf and confirm his defense, but Texas
law prohibited the co-participant from appearing on the stand." 9
The issues presented to the Court were whether the sixth amendment could be applied against the states through the fourteenth
amendment and, if so, whether the Texas statutes 20 prohibiting
co-participants in the same crime from testifying for one another
at 258. Justice Rutledge filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 278. Justice Frankfurter filed a
separate opinion, Id. at 283, and joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson. Id. at 286.
112. Id. at 258-59.
113. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. The Court stated:
[T]he fourteenth amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot be (secretly]
sentenced to prison. We further hold that failure to afford the [criminal defendant] a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of false and evasive
swearing was a denial of due process of law.

Id.
116. Id. at 278. "It is 'the law of the land' that no man's life, liberty or property be
forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a
public tribunal." Id., citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
117. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). Chief Justice Warren delivered the
opinion of the court. Justice Harlan filed an opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 23.
118. Id. at 15-16.
119. Id.
120. The applicable statutes were TEx. PENAL CODE, art. 82 (1925) and TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC., art. 711 (1925). Both were repealed by implication under Tax. CODE CraM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 36.09 (1965) after commencement of Washington's case. 388 U.S. at 16, n.4.
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violated Washington's constitutional rights under the compulsory
process clause.'
In terms of the first issue in Washington, the Court reviewed its
prior use of the fourteenth amendment to guarantee that the states
recognize a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel'
and to confront witnesses brought against him. 23 The Court reasoned that as a natural outgrowth of the defendant's right to present his own defense and confront his accusers, due process should
also require that the states permit a criminal defendant to present
witnesses favoring him.' 24 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that
the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment could be
25
applied against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The Court's analysis of the second issue, whether the compulsory process clause permits co-participants to testify on behalf of
one another, began with a recognition that, in general, the search
for truth is furthered by permitting witnesses with material and
relevant information to testify at trial, leaving judgment about the
testimony's credibility to the fact-finder. 2 a The Court found no
justification for the Texas procedural rule excluding all testimony
favoring the defense, especially when the state failed to exclude
testimony by a co-participant adverse to the defendant. 2 7 In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Texas laws actually
permitted a co-participant to testify when he had greater incentive
to perjure himself, but prohibited his testimony where it was potentially more reliable. 28 Thus, the Court held that Texas arbitrarily denied Washington his right to compulsory process when the
state denied him the opportunity to obtain witnesses in his
9
favor. "
The Supreme Court also discussed the rights of a criminal de121. Id. at 14-15.
122. Id. at 18, n.8, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
123. 388 U.S. at 18, n.9, citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
124. 388 U.S. at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 22, citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
127. 388 U.S. at 22. "The absurdity of the rule is amply demonstrated by the exceptions that have been made to it. For example, the accused accomplice may be called by the
prosecution to testify against the defendant." Id.
128. Id. at 23. The court noted that Texas permitted an accomplice, once acquitted, to
testify in his coparticipant's trial; thus, leaving him free to incriminate himself at the trial of
his coparticipant without fear of reprisal. "The Texas law leaves him free to testify when he
has a great incentive to perjury, and bars his testimony in situations where he has a lesser
motive to lie." Id.
129. Id.

1988

Recent Decision

fendant under the compulsory process clause in Farettav. California.'30 In that case, Faretta's attempts to waive assistance of counsel and represent himself against a charge of grand theft were
rejected by the trial judge. 3 1 The issue presented to the Court was
whether the sixth and fourteenth amendments provide a criminal
defendant with the right to intelligently elect to proceed through a
state trial without the assistance of counsel.8 2 The Court stated
that the sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to not only make a defense, but also personally present that
defense. 33 Also, the Court noted that the logic and intent behind
the sixth amendment providing 'assistance' of counsel to a criminal
defendant would demand that a defense attorney serve as the assistant, not the master at trial.3 Finally, the Court reviewed the
historical motivations behind the passage of the sixth amendment3' and determined that the founding fathers clearly intended
the accused to possess the right to self-representation.3 " Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Faretta possessed a constitutional right to represent himself at trial which was violated when
the California trial court forced upon him a court appointed
attorney.' 37
The right of a criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf
has received recognition from the fifth amendment's guarantee
against compelled testimony.' 8 In Harris v. New York,' the pros130. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Court's opinion was delivered by
Justice Stewart. Id. at 807. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion which was joined
by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id. at 836. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 846.
131. Id. at 807-11. Faretta was convicted of a grand theft by a trial jury and sentenced
to prison. Id.
132. Id. at 807. "Stated another way, the question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when
he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense." Id.
133. Id. at 819. "It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the witnesses against him,' and
who must be accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."' Id., citing
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
134. 422 U.S. at 820.
135. Id. at 821-32. The Court provided a long and detailed review of the right to selfrepresentation in common law England as well as in the American colonies. Id.
136. Id. at 831-32.
137. Id. at 836.
138. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710.
139. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The majority opinion was delivered by
Chief Justice Burger. Justice Black dissented without opinion. Id. at 226. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Id. Harris was
accused of selling heroin to an undercover police officer. Id. at 222-23.
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ecutor attempted to introduce evidence, which was inadmissible
under Miranda v. Arizona 140 to establish guilt, challenging the defendant's credibility as a witness. 1 The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether a criminal defendant's pretrial statements may
be used to impeach his credibility when the evidence is inadmissi2
ble under Miranda to establish the prosecution's case in chief.1
The Harris Court stipulated that while Miranda was not controlling in the present case, Walder v. United States"4 could be
relied upon for guidance.144 In both cases, the evidence aided the
jury in determining the witness' credibility, and the Supreme
Court reasoned that this benefit should not be discarded over unfounded concern about encouraging improper police conduct." 5
Also, the defendants in both instances voluntarily took the stand
to testify, and once they did so, they became subject to all the
truth seeking devices at the prosecutor's disposal.'14 Thus, the
Court held that when a criminal defendant exercises the right to
testify, his earlier, conflicting statements which are inadmissible
under Miranda can be utilized to impeach his testimony without
violating the fifth amendment privilege against self147
incrimination.

140. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was taken into custody, interrogated by the police, and submitted a confession, although he had not been informed of his
right to remain silent and have counsel present for questioning. Id. at 439. The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a criminal defendant is deprived of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when admissions obtained by the police without
proper procedural safeguards are thereafter used against the defendant at trial. Id. at 445.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, held that "the prosecution may not use
statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 444. The Court reasoned that without procedural safeguards the incommunicado police interrogation would likely elicit incriminating statements which were not of
Miranda's free choice. Id. at 445. Thus, the Supreme Court guaranteed under the fifth
amendment that a criminal defendant has a "right to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Id. at 460, (quoting Malloy v. Hogan 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
141. 401 U.S. at 223-24.
142. Id. at 222.
143. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder, the Supreme Court
found that physical evidence, inadmissible as part of the prosecutor's case in chief because
it was obtained from an illegal search and seizure, could nevertheless be used to impeach the
credibility of the criminal defendant's testimony. Id.
144. 401 U.S. at 225. "We are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that
warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder." Id.
145. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed that their decision would encourage the police
to violate a criminal suspect's Miranda rights. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 226.
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Although case law has established a criminal defendant's right to
testify under the fourteenth, sixth, and fifth amendments, the Supreme Court has made it clear that certain limitations exist on the
right to testify. In several early decisions,' 8 as well as in recent
due process cases, " 9 the Court has determined that the right to
testify cannot be absolute and must sometimes give way to other
compelling interests.'50
In the early case of Ex parte Terry,'51 the defendant, an attor-

ney, was charged with and convicted of contempt of court for assaulting a United States Marshall with a deadly weapon. 5 2 On appeal, Terry argued for reversal on the grounds that he was
committed to six months in jail without being present for sentencing, receiving notice of the hearing, or providing a defense to the
charges.' 5" The Supreme Court dismissed Terry's second and third
claims as immaterial, reasoning that punishment of acts committed
in the face of the court, which would impair or threaten the court's
authority, must take precedent over the procedural rights raised by
the violator.'"1 In response to Terry's first claim, the Court noted
that he voluntarily elected to leave the courtroom before sentencing and reasoned that he could not escape punishment in this
55

manner.L

The Supreme Court, however, in Cooke v. United States156 recognized a distinction where the contemptuous activity did not occur in open court. 1 57 The Court reasoned that the critical factor
which permitted the suspension of procedural rights rested not
with whether the judge personally observed the misconduct, but
148. See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) and Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925).
149. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
150. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
151. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
152. Id. at 298.
153. Id. at 306.
154. Id. at 306-07.
155. Id. at 310-11. The fact that Terry was sentenced on the same day as his misconduct in open court was critical to the Court's decision and the Justices took no position on
whether the same outcome would be permitted if Terry's conviction and sentencing had
been administered on a different day than when the incident occurred. Id. at 314.
156. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). There, Cooke, an attorney, was held
in contempt of court for a letter he wrote to the federal district court judge requesting the
judge to remove himself from pending cases because of clear bias. Id. at 519-21. Eleven days
later, Cooke was brought before the same judge and sentenced to thirty days in jail. Id. at
527.
157. Id. at 536.
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whether the activity took place in the open court room and
threatened the trial judge's authority and ability to proceed in an
orderly, respected fashion.1"" Thus, the Supreme Court would only
limit a criminal defendant's procedural due process rights in contempt cases where the conduct occurred in the trial court's presence, the trial judge observed the conduct, and the activity disrupted the court's proceedings in a manner that required instant
punishment to prevent a public loss of confidence in the court's
authority. "
In more contemporary Supreme Court cases, such as Goldberg v.
Kelly, '60 the Justices have recognized an individual's privilege to
exercise fourteenth amendment rights, but within certain limitations. In Kelly, the benefits provided to welfare recipients were
unilaterally cancelled by a government agency and could only be
reinstated at a post-termination hearing. 6 ' The issue before the
Court was whether the due process clause required that a recipient
of welfare benefits receive a hearing before the aid may be
discontinued. 62
The Supreme Court reasoned in Kelly that qualified citizens
possessed a statutory right to welfare benefits'8 3 and would face a
desperate situation during the period after the cut-off of aid and
before the post-termination hearing."" The Court determined that
a pre-termination hearing was necessary to protect the recipients'
due process rights,' 6 ' and that the benefit of this hearing outweighed the cost and administrative inconvenience to the government. 68 However, the Court stipulated that the pre-termination
158. Id.
159. Id. "Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that
committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and
have reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation." Id. at 537.
160. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of
the Court. Id. at 255. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justice Black. Id. at 282. Justice Black presented a dissenting opinion. Id. at 271. Justice
Stewart filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 285.
161. Id. at 258-59.
162. Id. at 260.
163. Id. at 262.
164. Id. at 264.
165. Id. "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss.' " Id. at 26263, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
166. 397 U.S. at 266. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature
of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
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17
hearing should not assume the form of a quasi-judicial forum 1
and need only test the validity of the government's decision to disat
continue benefits. 168 Therefore, the Supreme Court guaranteed
16 9
the pre-termination hearing only minimum procedural rights.
The Supreme Court also found that a person's fourteenth
70
amendment rights could be modified in Morrissey v. Brewer.1
There, Morrissey's parole was revoked by the state Board of Pa7
role, without a hearing, on the basis of a parole officer's report.1 '
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the due process
clause entitled 2Morrissey to some form of hearing before his parole
7
was revoked.1
The Court's analysis began with a recognition that, although on
parole, Morrissey possessed a liberty interest under the fourteenth
amendment entitling him to some due process protection.' 73 In a
balancing of Morrissey's and the state's interests, the Supreme
Court stipulated that Morrissey had strong liberty interest in remaining free from imprisonment and functioning as a productive
member of society.17' From the state's perspective, Morrissey committed a crime which justifies the state placing restrictions on him
without the burden of needing a full adversarial proceeding before
revoking his parole. 75 Thus, the Court determined that while Morrissey was not entitled to the full panoply of due process rights, he
should receive an informal, preliminary hearing 76 by an indepen-

by governmental action." Id. at 263, citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
167. 397 U.S. at 266. The Court reasoned that the government's "fair hearing," available after benefits were discontinued, to review appeals from welfare recipients provided full
procedural protection. Id. at 266-67.
168. Id. at 267.
169. Id. at 267. The Court only required the pre-termination hearing provide a welfare
recipient with: timely and adequate notice, id., an opportunity to orally present evidence, id.
at 268, confrontation as well as cross-examination of adverse witnesses, id. at 270, and freedom to retain counsel. Id.
170. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Chief Justice Burger presented the majority opinion. Id. at 472. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
result. Id. at 490. Justice Douglas filed an opinion dissenting in part. Id. at 491.
171. Id. at 472-73.
172. Id. at 472. The Court noted at the outset that a parole revocation was not part of
the criminal trial, and thus, Morrissey was not entitled to the full range of rights associated
with a criminal prosecution. Id. at 480, citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
173. 408 U.S. at 481. For the test of whether a person maintains a 'liberty or property'
interest under the fourteenth amendment, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
174. 408 U.S. at 482. The Court also noted that society had an interest in attempting
to convert Morrissey into a useful and normal member of the community. Id. at 484.
175. Id. at 483.
176. Id. at 485-87. In regard to the preliminary hearing, the presiding officer should
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dent officer "7 and a revocation hearing by the appropriate parole
1 8
authority. 7
Although the Supreme Court has addressed many of the constitutional issues associated with a criminal defendant's right to testify at trial, the state and lower federal courts have provided most
of the case law in the area of hypnotically induced testimony. Most
courts have adopted one of four approaches to the admissibility of
post-hypnotically induced testimony at trial. 17 9 They include requiring a trial court to: 1) admit hypnotically induced testimony,
but allow the fact-finder to weigh its credibility; 80 2) determine
the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony on a case-bycase basis;' 81 3) exclude all hypnotically induced testimony because
it tends to be unreliable; 82 or, 4) follow procedural guidelines that
reduce the risks associated with hypnosis.18 3
In the first category of hypnosis cases, State v. Brown 8 4 outlined
use a probable cause standard, the parolee should receive notice, and may present evidence,
but he does not have an absolute right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. Id. at 487. Justice Brennan's concurrence would also provide the parolee with
assistance of counsel. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
177. 408 U.S. at 486. "This independent officer need not be a judicial officer." Id.
178. Id. at 487-89. In the revocation hearing, the
minimum requirements of due process ...include (a) written notice of the claimed
violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. Justice Brennan's concurrence would also provide the parolee with assistance of
counsel. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 254
(1970).
179. Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 2713.
180. Id. at 2713, n.16. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983) and
United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
181. 107 S. Ct. at 2713, n.16. See, e.g., Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986), and State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571
(1984).
182. 107 S. Ct. at 2712, n.14. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436
A.2d 170 (1981), Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), Bundy v. State, 471
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986), and Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129
(Alaska 1986).
183. 107 S. Ct. at 2713, n.16. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 36 (1981).
184. 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983). There, a young woman was attacked, but could not
remember any details of the crime. Id. at 139. The victim was placed under hypnosis by an
agent of the North Dakota Crime Bureau and after being instructed to act as a news reporter, the young woman emotionally and vividly re-enacted the events of the attack. Id. at
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the reasoning behind admitting post-hypnotically induced testimony, while permitting its credibility to be evaluated by the factfinder. The issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was
whether the post-hypnotic testimony of a witness could be admitted at a criminal trial in state court. 8 5 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reasoned that because the purpose of a trial was to seek the
truth, admitting hypnotically induced testimony was preferable to
a per se exclusion. 8" The high court considered a challenge to the
credibility of a witness, through cross-examination, to be the appropriate method for weighing the value of hypnotically refreshed
testimony. 187 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
hypnosis of witnesses before trial could affect their credibility in
the eyes of the jury, but not affect the admissibility of testimony at
88
trial.1
Although the first category of hypnosis cases recognizes the admissibility of testimony, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Awkard' 89 found that the determination of credibility by the jury could not be unduly influenced by expert testimony. In Awkard, the issue before the ninth circuit, assuming that
hypnotically refreshed testimony was admissible, 9 0 was whether
the expert who hypnotized the witness could testify before the witness in order to buttress the witness' credibility.' The court rea141. In a second hypnotic session, the victim provided a detailed description of the assailant, which resulted in the arrest of defendant Brown. Id. at 142.
185. Id. at 138.
186. Id. at 151. The North Dakota Supreme Court drew a parallel between expert
witnesses on hypnosis and medical experts. Id. The court concluded that since a jury was
capable of finding the truth in conflicting medical testimony a jury was also competent to
make a similar decision when confronted with opposing expert testimony on hypnosis. Id. at
151-52.
187. Id. at 151.
188. Id.
189. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979). There, a prison inmate named Hackney, who participated in the fatal stabbing of
another prisoner, was granted immunity in exchange for revealing the identities of, and testifying against, the other attackers. Hackney recalled the names of a few participants, and
after being hypnotized by Dr. Kroger, an expert in the field, the government witness identified several additional individuals. At trial, Dr. Kroger appeared as an expert witness and
testified about the accuracy of Hackney's hypnotically refreshed memory before he testified
as to the identity of the murder participants. Id. at 669.
190. Id. at 669. The court of appeals readily recognized that hypnotically induced testimony was admissible within the circuit. Id., citing United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193,
198-99 (9th Cir. 1978) and Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975).
191. 597 F.2d at 669. Dr. Kroger's testimony not only discussed the general advantages
and results of hypnosis and the procedure utilized on Hackney, but also gave his opinion
that Hackney's memory had been accurately refreshed. Id. at 670-71.
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soned that permitting a recognized expert on hypnosis to testify
prior to his patient, a prosecution witness, created a highly prejudicial situation, especially since the defense had already stipulated
that it had no intention of cross-examining the prosecution witness
about his hypnosis.19 2 However, even if the defense had planned
cross-examination on this matter, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the expert witness still could not give his personal opinion as to
the accuracy of the prosecution witness' memory, since the credibility of his post-hypnotically induced testimony must be decided
by the jury. 9 3
The second category of hypnosis cases recommends that a trial
court conduct an individualized inquiry into each case to determine admissibility. In Wicker v. McCotter,'" the issue before the
fifth circuit was whether a criminal defendant's due process rights
were violated when the witness, after undergoing hypnosis, testified at trial that she had identified Wicker in a photo spread as the
attacker of the murder victim. 195 The court of appeals stated that
the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 96 The court reasoned that a trial
judge should use the standard evidentiary evaluation of whether
the probative value of the hypnotically refreshed testimony outweighs its prejudicial effect. 9 '
In State v. Iwakiri,198 the Idaho Supreme Court also took the
192. Id. at 670.
193. Id. at 670-71. "Credibility... is for jury-the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom." Id. at 671, citing United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974).
194. Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010
(1986). In Wicker, two witnesses observed a struggle between a man and woman before the
man forced the woman into a car and drove away. The woman was found murdered and one
of the witnesses tentatively identified the victim's husband as the culprit. Id. at 489. After
independent evidence incriminated Wicker as the murderer, the witness submitted to hypnosis and then identified Wicker in a police photo spread. Id. at 490. At trial, the witness
initially only testified in accordance with her pre-hypnosis statement to the police. On crossexamination, Wicker's counsel questioned the witness about identifying Wicker in the photo
spread. On redirect, the prosecutor elicited from the witness that the identification of
Wicker occurred after hypnosis. Id. at 492.
195. Id. at 492.
196. Id.
197. Id. In Wicker's specific case, the court reasoned that because the witness' prehypnotic statements paralleled her post-hypnotic identification of Wicker, he was not
prejudiced against by her testimony at trial. Also, the court found that the witness' testimony possessed probative value since it was subjected to complete cross-examination and
her statements were corroborated by not only independent testimony, but also Wicker's own
confession. Id. at 492-93.
198. State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 617, 682 P.2d 571 (1984). In that case, Boyer, a wit-
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position that a trial court should complete an individualized inquiry into the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. 199
The issue before the Idaho court was whether a witness was competent to testify at trial about those facts remembered subsequent
20 0
to hypnosis.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Iwakiri considered the trial court
to be the most competent to deal with evidentiary issues and reasoned that the lower court should therefore have flexibility to determine the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 0 1 The
Idaho Supreme Court established that a trial court, faced with a
previously hypnotized witness, should first conduct a pretrial hearing to evaluate whether procedural safe-guards are properly administered.2 02 This would allow the benefit of memory recall, yet
protect against the dangers of hypnosis.20 Next, applying a totality
of the circumstances' test, the trial court should determine the reliability of the witness' testimony and, finally, deem the witness
2 4
competent or incompetent to testify at trial.
In the third category of hypnosis cases, several courts have determined that hypnotically-refreshed testimony should be considered inadmissible per se. In Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, °5 the
issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether hypnotically-refreshed testimony was admissible in a criminal trial when
the witness had no recollection of facts related to the crime before
being hypnotized. 20 6 The Pennsylvania court in Nazarovitch
ness to a kidnapping, was hypnotized in order to refresh her memory by a detective of the
Boise Police Department and Dr. Streib, an expert at the Boise Hypnosis Center. Id. at 573.
199. Id. at 578.
200. Id. at 575.
201. Id. at 579.
202. Id. at 578. The Supreme Court of Idaho adopted a modified version of the safeguards outlined by Dr. Martin Orne, an expert in hypnotically induced testimony. See, e.g.,
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, 89-90 (1981).
203. 682 P.2d at 578.

204. Id.
205. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981). There, a twelve
year old girl was murdered, but no clues were discovered to incriminate any suspects. Three
years later, a woman, who previously had been unable to recall any events of the murder,
informed police that she was experiencing nightmares about the girl's murder. Id. at 99.
The woman was placed under hypnosis on four separate occasions, after which she implicated Nazarovitch and two other defendants. Id. at 99-100. The trial court held a preliminary hearing to determine the woman's competency to testify and granted the defendant's
motion to suppress her testimony. Id. at 100-01. The Commonwealth filed an appeal claiming "that hypnosis must be viewed as simply another method of refreshing a witness' recollection in that it accomplishes the stimulation of a latent memory just as the more traditional aids of memoranda and documents do." Id. at 101.
206. Id. at 99, 436 A.2d at 171.
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agreed with commentators who argued that hypnosis used for forensic purposes created problems of hypersuggestibility, hypercompliance, and confabulation which distorted a hypnotized witness'
sense of reality. 207 The court applied the Frye test,2 08 noted that
the scientific community could not assure the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony,20 9 and concluded that until more conclusive proof about the reliability of hypnotically induced testimony could be established, the witness' statements would be

inadmissible.21
In Bundy v. State, 1 the Florida Supreme Court, when addressing the issue of whether hypnotically induced testimony could be
admitted in a criminal trial, also found hypnotically refreshed testimony to be inadmissible per se.2 1 2 The Florida court reviewed
case law from other jurisdictions which found hypnotically enhanced testimony inherently unreliable under either the Frye analysis, 2 13 or as a matter of law under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,
or a combination of both.21 3 The Bundy court reasoned that the use of hypnosis had failed to receive widespread
acknowledgment from the scientific community, and therefore,
concluded that the speculative, probative value of hypnotically in207. Id. at 104-05, 436 A.2d at 174. "Thus, the hypnotically recalled memory is apt to
be a mosaic of (1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure
fantasy, and (4) fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole." Id. at 105 (quoting
Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 313, 335 (1980)).
208. 496 Pa. at 101, 436 A.2d at 174. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). In Frye, defense counsel attempted to introduce expert testimony of the defendant's
performance in a systolic blood pressure deception test. Id. The trial court excluded the
evidence and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that "while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
209. 496 Pa. at 105, 436 A.2d 175. "Most authorities agree that a general rule of reliability of the veracity of statements elicited during hypnosis cannot be formulated." Id., citing Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 583 (1977).
210. 496 Pa. at 111, 436 A.2d at 178.
211. Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986).
There, the state's key witness, the only eyewitness to the kidnapping of a murder victim,
submitted to hypnosis to refresh his memory of the incident several months earlier. Id. at
12-13.
212. Id. at 18.
213. See supra note 208.
214. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 stipulates that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
." Id.
215. 471 So. 2d at 13.
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duced testimony would never outweigh its prejudicial impact.216
Having found testimony of that nature inherently unreliable, the
Florida Supreme Court held hypnotically enhanced testimony
inadmissible per se.21 7
The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Contreras v. State.218 The issue before the court was whether a witness
could identify her assailant at trial based upon recollections derived from hypnosis, or whether the witness' statements must be
limited to pre-hypnosis memories.2 19 The Alaska court based its
analysis on both the Frye decision 220 and Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.22 ' In applying Frye, the court reasoned that the
use of hypnosis was still in an underdeveloped stage that had not
yet gained general acceptance in the scientific community. 22 In analyzing Rule 403, the court determined that the probative value of
admitting post-hypnotic testimony could not outweigh the
prejudice to the criminal defendant since hypnosis fostered sug223
gestibility, confabulation and artificially enhanced certainty.
Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a hypnotized witness'
testimony would be limited at trial to facts remembered before
hypnosis, and that any information recalled subsequently would be
inadmissible.2 24
The fourth and final category of hypnosis cases considered the
use of procedural safeguards to help ensure the reliability of hypnotically induced testimony. In State v. Hurd,2 the New Jersey
216. Id. at 18, citing People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 626-27, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748
(1982).
217. 471 So. 2d at 18.
218. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986). There, in two separate cases that
were consolidated on appeal, the victims of violent crimes were placed under hypnosis to
help them identify their assailants. Id. at 130-31.
219. Id. at 129.
220. Id. at 134-36. See supra note 208.
There are four reasons why the Frye 'general acceptance' standard is appropriate
when reviewing the admission of new scientific evidence: 1) the standard is judicially
manageable; 2) the standard saves judicial time and resources; 3) the standard assures that juries will not be misled by unproven, unsound 'scientific' procedures, thus
safeguarding the court's truth-finding role; and 4) the standard assures fairness and
uniformity of decision making.
718 P.2d at 135.
221. Id. at 136-38. See supra note 214.
222. 718 P.2d at 136.
223. Id. at 138.
224. Id. at 130.
225. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). There, a woman was stabbed in her own apartment, but could not identify her assailant. Id. at 529-30, 432 A.2d at 88. The woman submitted to hypnosis and six days later gave a statement to police identifying her former hus-
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Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the hypnotically enhanced testimony of a state witness was admissible at a criminal
trial when the witness' hypnosis session failed to follow strict procedural safeguards.2 2 6 The court ruled that as long as procedural
safeguards are closely observed, hypnotically refreshed testimony
could be considered reliable, and thus, admissible at trial.2 2 7 However, the opponent of admission would remain free to convince the
fact-finder to give less weight to hypnotically induced testimony by
challenging the specific hypnosis procedures utilized on the
28
witness.
The Hurd court reasoned that the testimony
resulting from hypnosis would be admissible where a scientific procedure could elicit
a reasonably reliable result.2 2 9 The New Jersey court established
the level of reliability for hypnotically induced testimony as equal
to the reliability of the ordinary recall of a witness not subjected to
hypnosis. 2s0 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court would admit
hypnotically refreshed testimony obtained under proper procedural safeguards 3 1 that would permit a witness to reveal, in a reliband, Hurd, as the attacker. Id. at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 88-89. However, after the hypnosis,
but prior to her admission to the police, the woman expressed doubts "about her thinking."
Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
226. Id. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
227. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95. However, in the present case, the court refused to
admit the woman's identification of Hurd since the state failed to demonstrate by 'clear and
convincing' evidence that the hypnosis procedure used on the woman was reliable. Id. at
548, 432 A.2d at 98.
228. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
229. Id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91. The court further reasoned that "[i]f the procedure is
not capable of yielding reasonable reliable results then its probative value may be outweighed by the risks entailed in its use in a criminal trial." Id.
230. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
231. The Hurd court utilized the following six procedural safe-guards to ensure reliability equivalent to normal recall.
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session.. . . Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should
be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator, or defense. . . . Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or
another suitable form. . . . Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should
obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers
them. The hypnotist should carefully avoid influencing the description by asking
structured questions or adding new details. . . . Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded. . . . The use of videotape, the only effective
record of visual cues, is strongly encouraged but not mandatory . . . Sixth, only the
hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session,
including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview.
Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
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able manner, normal recall of past facts and events. 3 ,
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Rock stands for the proposition
that a state court cannot adopt a per se inadmissibility rule for
hypnotically induced testimony in a criminal trial. 2s3 The majority's decision was clearly correct in ruling that a criminal defend23 4
ant possesses a constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.
Collectively, the fourteenth amendment due process clause, 3 sixth
amendment compulsory process clause,2 3 6 and the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination2 37 establish the defendant's fundamental right to testify on his own behalf.
In order to limit the potential inaccuracies of hypnosis and assess the credibility of the defendant's testimony, the Rock opinion
requires the trial judge to conduct an individualized inquiry into
238
each case to determine whether proper procedural safeguards
are followed and corroborating evidence exists.23 s However, except
for the physical evidence discussed in Rock,2 " the Supreme Court
failed to elaborate on what type of evidence may be used to corroborate. Based upon the experiences of other courts, Justice Blackmun's opinion should have included the testimony of other wit242
nesses2 41 and the criminal defendant's pre-hypnosis statements
as further criteria for evaluating the sufficiency of corroborating
evidence. In addition, as Rock discusses, the trial judge should
also consider whether cross-examination and jury instructions
would help improve the reliability and credibility of post-hypnotic
testimony., 3
Assuming the trial judge finds that procedural safeguards are
followed and corroborating evidence exists, the Supreme Court's
232. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 96.
233. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
234. Id. at 2708.
235. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973), and In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
236. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) and Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975).
237. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
238. See the Hurd procedural safeguards at note 231 supra.
239. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
240. Id. at 2707.
241. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d at 667. There, the ninth circuit endorsed
one prison inmate's hypnotically induced testimony when it was corroborated by the testimony of another inmate who was not subjected to hypnosis. Id. at 671.
242. See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d at 9. Although the Florida Supreme Court excluded post-hypnotically refreshed testimony, the court permitted documented, pre-hypnosis facts and events to be admitted. Id. at 19.
243. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
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analysis of the Rock decision could comfortably be extended to establish a per se admissibility rule for the hypnotically refreshed
testimony of a criminal defendant appearing at trial on his own
behalf."4 This conclusion appears logical based upon the constitutional underpinnings of a criminal defendant's right to testify, and
the recent judicial acceptance of hypnosis as an asset at trial to the
truth-finding process.24 5 A criminal defendant's right to testify is
so fundamental to his interest in the trial process that to prohibit
his testimony, after he satisfies the procedural guidelines and provides corroborating evidence, would amount to a deprivation of his
constitutional rights.
A further consideration not settled by the Supreme Court concerns whether a witness, in favor of a criminal defendant, may testify to observations remembered subsequent to hypnosis. Under
the extension of the Court's analysis in Rock, the rationale for administering a per se admissibility rule to a criminal defendant to
testify on his own behalf would also apply to other witnesses appearing at trial for the accused. Similar to the constitutional right
of a criminal defendant to testify,246the accused possesses a constitutional right to have favorable witnesses testify under the sixth
amendment compulsory process clause.247 Thus, this constitutional
underpinning, combined with the factors for establishing the reliability of hypnosis, 4 8 would require judicial acceptance of the hypnotically induced testimony of a witness testifying for the criminal
defendant.
An extension of the Rock analysis to create a per se admissibility
rule for the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a criminal defendant and his witnesses naturally raises the question of whether a
similar rule may be applied to the prosecution's witnesses in a
criminal trial. The per se admissibility rule for hypnotically induced testimony requires a constitutional underpinning and assur244. The Rock Court stated that they were not "prepared to endorse without qualification the use of hypnosis as an investigative tool." Id. at 2714. However, if the qualifications of procedural safeguards and corroborating evidence are satisfied, the court's analysis
should logically result in a per se admission rule for a criminal defendant to testify on his
own behalf.
245. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme
Court argued hypnotically refreshed testimony appears equivalent to the ordinary recall of a
normal witness, in the sense that "the reliability of ordinary eyewitnesses reveals similar
shortcomings." Id. at 541-42.
246. See supra notes 235-237.
247. See supra note 236.
248. Procedural safeguards and corroborating evidence.
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ances of reliability. In the case of a witness for the state, the requirement of procedural guidelines and corroborating evidence
could be satisfied, but no constitutional right to testify exists.
Therefore, the per se admissibility rule appears inappropriate for
the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a prosecution witness.
Instead of a per se admissibility rule for state witnesses who
have submitted to hypnosis, a trial court should apply an analysis
similar to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 49 Thus,
where no constitutional right to testify exists, the trial judge
should retain discretion to weigh the probative value of a government witness' hypnotically induced testimony against the prejudicial impact of the testimony on the criminal defendant.
Christine M. Dolfi

249.

See supra note 214.

